This paper deals with the hierarchical structure of smart-grid systems. The major challenges of this structure are to balance electric power production and consumption within the hierarchical smart grid, and makes active use of the flexibility of a large number of power producing and consuming units. In this study, we present a new triple game based energy management scheme for the hierarchical smart-grid architecture. By using the Nash with claim, midpoint-constrained egalitarian and proportional bargaining solutions, the proposed approach can adaptively distribute the limited energy resource of smart-grid system. To reduce the computation complexity, these bargaining solutions are hierarchically applied based on the developed triple game model. According to the attractive characteristics of each bargaining solution, control decisions in our proposed scheme are mutually dependent on each other and can cause cascade interactions to reach a desirable system performance. The results obtained from the simulation analysis illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme compared with the existing state-of-the-art protocols. Finally, we conclude advantages of our triple game based energy management scheme and identify research areas for future study.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the end of the First World War, the global urban population has grown nine-fold. The world population is expected to reach to 9 billion in 2050 while expecting that the population percentage in urban areas will grow up to 70%. At the same time, more than 80% of the world global GDP is generated in cities, and it has become increasingly vital to find better ways of managing these urban populations and the services they require. In the face of such rapid growth, population-dense cities are obviously huge sources of power demand, consuming two-thirds of the world's energy. As cities continue to grow, they are using innovative technologies to improve the infrastructure efficiency for a better and smarter way of urbanites living. Therefore, there are urgent needs to a The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Ayaz Ahmad . move towards urban sustainability, in particular planning and management of energy consumption [1] , [2] .
Today, we have an increasing tendency towards smartening of cities, achieve on going improvement and innovation. The concept of smart city is a relatively new idea that has been defined recently. In brief, it can be defined as a city which uses information and communication technologies (ICT) to make city lives more comfortable, efficient, and sustainable. Usually, smart city management can vary dramatically depending on the implementation approach. Until now, several attempts have been made at formulating a definition of the smart city, taking different perspectives. By using the ICT tools, many governments have already adopted the smart city projects as a key program, in order to i) maximize energy efficiency, ii) strengthen network infrastructures, and iii) supply innovative services. As a result, city planners, managers, and policy makers take optimal or close-to-optimal decisions on the use VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ of the available city resources to reduce energy consumption while improving quality of service (QoS) [2] , [3] . For future smart cities, smart-grid has been introduced to support a sustainable high-quality lifestyle for citizens. As an electricity network, smart-grid system is designed to overcome the weakness of conventional electrical grids via two-way digital communications. To meet the goals of future cities, smart cities and smart-grids are strictly correlated; smart-grid sits at the heart of the smart city, and cannot fully exist without a smart city. Therefore, the smart-grid plays an important role in a smart city to improve the robustness and efficiency of electrical systems, and to modernize the power distribution infrastructure [4] .
With the introduction of the smart-grid infrastructure, the entire business model will be changed together with the relationship between energy service providers and all consumers of electric powers. Recently, the increasing penetration of distributed generation from renewable energy sources and energy storage systems paves the way to new market models that favor a local usage of the generated electricity. Especially, small-scale electrical power generators located closer at the point of use are gaining increasing popularity while making a more efficient use of energy resources at a local level. As a small-scale self-sustainable energy unit, the idea of micro-grid is introduced. As a prosumer, i.e., producer and consumer, micro-grid is defined as a group of interconnected loads and distributed energy resources (DERs) within clearly defined electrical boundaries that acts as a single controllable entity with respect to the smart-grid. Therefore, micro-grid might be regarded as a smaller piece of the smart-grid, and may provide services in a more distributed and consumerinteractive manner [5] .
Despite many advantages of micro-grids, there are major challenges to connecting micro-grid system to the smartgrid. One biggest challenge is how to adaptively control the possibility of coordinating the distributed resources in a more intelligent way so that each individual micro-grid can behave as a controlled entity. In this way, distributed resources can provide their full advantages in a more consistent way [5] . However, the inability to control the increased number of distributed energy sources in micro-grids can create huge difficulties in operating and controlling the distribution network. To solve this problem, a hierarchical smart-grid architecture has been introduced. This approach not only assures the scalability of the grid model, but also allows for sufficient resource pooling among micro-grid units. It is also important to notice that the hierarchical architecture can be robust against cascading failures in a smart-grid due to its design mechanism based on self-containment at various granular levels. Therefore, this hierarchical structure significantly enhances the smart-grid reliability by routing power flow within and across different micro-grid units while mitigating uncertainties in a distributed manner [6] .
In this paper, we are concerned with developing a new energy management scheme based on the hierarchical smartgrid architecture. The implementation of smart-grid energy management requires an efficient strategy to coordinate the power exchange among participating micro-grid units. The coordination strategy proposed in this study is initially inspired by bargaining game theory. Bargaining theory is the branch of game theory dealing with the analysis of bargaining problems, in which some parties bargain over the division of certain goods. A solution to a bargaining problem means the determination of such a division. Examples of simple as well as more complex applications of bargaining theory are related to economic, biology, political and social situations abound, where conflict and cooperation exist. Since the early 2000s, ICT and network management have been added to this list [7] .
A. MOTIVATION AND CONTRIBUTION
Motivated by the above discussion, we design a novel energy management scheme for hierarchical smart-grid systems. Based on the key ideas of Nash with claim, midpointconstrained egalitarian and proportional bargaining solutions, our proposed energy management scheme is developed as a triple game model. These three different bargaining solutions exhibit a number of interesting axiomatic properties and can be supported from a game-theoretic perspective. Based on the hierarchical smart-grid infrastructure, they are integrated into our proposed game model, and work together in a coordinated manner. During the proposed triple bargaining game process, our hierarchical cooperation strategy can ensure mutual advantages while achieving a globally desirable grid system performance. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to investigate the hierarchical smart-grid control process based on the triple bargaining solutions. Major contributions of this paper are listed as follows;
• we contemplate the original Nash with claim, midpoint-constrained egalitarian and proportional bargaining solutions, and explore traditional bargaining ideas. These bargaining solutions preserve the attractive features while providing new axiomatic characteristics.
• we design a hierarchical smart-grid infrastructure, which is divided into three layers; primary level, macro level and micro level. And then, a new hierarchical control paradigm is proposed for the flexible and effective cooperation of power exchanges while balancing conflicting performance criteria.
• we develop a distributed control mechanism based on a three-tier hierarchical infrastructure. This approach can reduce the computational load of each control agent in the smart-grid system, which makes the proposed decision model a suitable choice for wide-scale implementation in real-time operations.
• the synergy effect is a consequence of the reciprocal combination of different bargaining solutions. To strike the appropriate performance balance, we can provide feedback interactions until the system reaches an effective solution.
• we demonstrate the performance improvement through extensive simulations. By discussing and analyzing the simulations results, we validate and confirm the superiority of the proposed approach compared with existing state-of-the art protocols.
B. ORGANIZATION
This paper is structured as follows. Section II briefly introduces related work about the energy management for smart-grid system. In Section III, we provide a hierarchical smart-grid architecture, and describe some preliminaries about the Nash with claim, midpoint-constrained egalitarian and proportional bargaining solutions. And then, we formulate a new triple bargaining game model to design our smartgrid energy management scheme, and outline the main steps of proposed algorithm. The simulation setup and numerical results are given in Section IV. In this section, we can validate the effectiveness of our triple game approach by comparing with existing protocols. Finally, we summarize our concluding remarks, and give future research topics in Section V.
II. RELATED WORK
Due to its advantages of hierarchical smart-grid system, several papers have addressed different aspects of the controlling and energy management problem in that system. With multiple micro-grids, they are aiming for the optimal operation while taking into account dynamic energy demands. The paper [6] proposes a hierarchical architecture for the utility-customer interaction consisting of sub-components of customer load prediction, renewable generation integration, power-load balancing and demand response. Within this hierarchical architecture, the study in [6] focuses on the problem of real-time scheduling in an abstract grid model consisting of one controller and multiple customer units. With an abstract model consisting of one controller and multiple customers developed, a new two-step decision framework is formulated for the real-time scheduling. The two-step decision framework consisted of i) centralized controller sequential decisions and ii) distributed customer decisions [6] .
In [17] , a hierarchical iterative control algorithm is proposed to optimally balance grid load while meeting consumers power demand. This hierarchical architecture is based on the assumption that a certain proportion of the consumers can predict their consumption profile and adapt their control strategies to fulfill power consumption constraints. It is assumed that a simplified model of the power grid and a prediction based on historical data for the consumption profile of passive consumers are available. The proposed control algorithm has low-communication requirements and effectively deals with the case of noncompliant consumers [17] .
The authors in [18] propose a hierarchical transactive control architecture that combines market transactions at the higher levels with inter-area and unit-level control at the lower levels. This architecture consists of a primary, secondary, and tertiary levels, and operates over time-scales that range from seconds to minutes. With a goal of ensuring frequency regulation, global asymptotic stability of the overall system is established in the presence of uncertainties at all three timescales [18] . Even though the studies in [6] , [17] , [18] introduced new concepts, however, these ideas did not consider the bargaining process.
K. Dehghanpour and H. Nehrir propose an agent-based hierarchical power management protocol, called the Cooperative Agent-based Hierarchical Bargaining (CAHB) scheme, for several micro-grids [8] . To obtain a fair and Paretooptimal solution to the power management problem, they design a new micro-grid bargaining model based on the Nash bargaining solution. The CAHB scheme consists of three levels; the lower, upper and highest levels. At the lower level, multiple micro-grids bargain with each other to cooperatively obtain a fair-efficient solution to their power management problem. At the upper level, the main control agents interact with each other to satisfy the constraint of power balance. While the lower level agents do not participate in the upper level bargaining process directly, the outcome of the lower level process is affected by the upper level negotiations. At the highest level, a power utility company acts as a retail market agent, and facilitates power exchanges between the distribution system and the wholesale market. To verify its applicability, the CAHB scheme is tested on a system with multiple micro-grids, with each micro-grid having different load/generation data [8] .
The Game-theoretic Distributed Energy Trading (GDET) scheme is a distributed algorithm for the energy trading mechanism among micro-grids in a competitive market [9] . In this scheme, energy sellers lead the competition by independently deciding the amount of using energy by considering the attained satisfaction from the received revenue. Energy buyers follow the sellers' actions by independently submitting a unit price bid to the sellers. Proportional sharing applies to both sides of the competition, where the energy is allocated to the buyers in proportion to their bids and where the revenue is allocated to the sellers in proportion to their sales. With a hierarchical decision-making structure, the GDET scheme adopts the Stackelberg game model to converge a unique equilibrium solution while maximizing the payoff for all participating micro-grids. Through rigorous game-theoretic analysis, it is proven that the GDET scheme has comparable performance to the optimal centralized solution [9] .
The paper [10] proposes the Leader-Follower based Energy Management (LFEM) scheme for several microgrids. This scheme investigates the impact of the participation of demand resources in the energy market. By using the bilevel-programming technique, which is originating from hierarchical optimization problems, the interactions of the energy services provider (ESP) and the electricity market are formulated; the ESP is considered to manage several microgrids. Based on the cost of each resource, the ESP selects the sources that will be dispatched in order to serve the load. Its options include curtailing part of the load or supplying energy produced either by the local production units of the lower level, or by the central unit of the upper level. With the upper level unit, the profit margin impacts over the decision of the ESP. If the upper level's profit margin is too high, the ESP will prefer the local production units or load curtailment. Therefore, the ESP seeks the optimal combination of generation mix, i.e., lower and upper production units, and load curtailment. At this point, the assumption of bilateral agreement can be easily adapted to include interaction with the wholesale market [10] .
The CAHB, GDET and LFEM schemes [8]- [10] have introduced unique challenges and adopt the game theory to efficiently implement the energy management algorithm for the hierarchical smart-grid system. Therefore, they have attracted a lot of attentions among game theory researchers. However, none of these studies explore the hierarchical cooperative game approach based on the different bargaining combination. Compared to these existing schemes in [8] - [10] , we demonstrate that our proposed scheme attains a better performance during the hierarchical smart-grid system operation.
III. PROPOSED SMART-GRID MANAGEMENT SCHEME
In this section, we introduce the architecture of hierarchical smart-grid system. Afterward, the main ideas of three different bargaining solutions are preliminarily explained. And then, the triple bargaining game is formulated to design our energy management scheme. Finally, we present concretely the proposed scheme in the eight-step procedures.
A. THE HIERARCHICAL SMART-GRID SYSTEM INFRASTRUCTURE
A key feature of hierarchical smart-grid architecture is that multiple micro-grids are dispersed over a wide area, and they are interconnected to each other by distribution power networks. These distributed micro-grids may be connected to the main smart-grid at some point as well. In this study, the hierarchical smart-grid infrastructure consists of three control levels. Depending on the levels, grid controllers can be categorized to micro-grid local controllers (MLCs), micro-grid global controllers (MGCs) and smart-grid central controller (SCC). At the primary level, the SCC constantly monitors multiple MGCs, and manages the power flow control. It is responsible for the power balance in the smart-grid system. At the secondary level, MGCs are deployed in coverage areas, which cover their associated micro-grids. MGCs are connected to the SCC, and work as gateways to and from the smart-grid system. At the tertiary level, MLCs serves as the heart of individual microgrids to deliver stable and reliable electricity. They address the technical challenges of micro-grid operations while considering the costs and environmental conditions associated with energy productions. With three levels, the hierarchical smart-grid system is implemented in a cascade manner.
As a single intelligent entity in the distribution system, each micro-grid is a reliable power source in a small package which integrates effectively various sources of distributed generation (DG), especially Renewable Energy Sources (RES), to meet the fluctuating demand for energy. Recently, RESs are becoming prominent alternatives to conventional power sources due to the developments like i) improved efficiencies, ii) reduced costs of generators, and iii) decreased the uncertainty of energy availability, etc. Each MLC has certain self-containing capabilities, and adaptively controls the micro-grid integrity, reliability and stability. A set of geographically adjacent MLCs are grouped and connected their corresponding MGC [11] .
Using the hierarchical architecture gives rise to the multiresolution mechanism. In general, the main goal of primary level control is to find out the best solution of energy distribution for selfish and rational MGCs. The SCC is mainly for monitoring the running operations of MGCs in different districts, and attempts to achieve the main goal. The overall power grid planning is formed on this level, and the decisionmaking process includes the overall energy policy. At the secondary level, the assigned energy amount in each MGC is divided into its associated MLCs. In a dispersive and parallel manner, individual MGCs work independently for all the connected MLCs. As a middle level gateway, each MGC makes managerial type control decisions. These decisions can arouse a series of effects to lower-level controllers. At the tertiary level, the allocated energy amount in each MLC is allotted for its associated micro-grid devices. At the bottom of the hierarchy, MLCs have the smallest planning scale to support their micro-grid operations. The major function of MLC is to help the local micro-grid to achieve global controllability.
Based on the combined design of different three phases, our integrated approach attempts to ensure the selfadaptability and real-time effectiveness. To leverage the full synergy of the hierarchical interdependence among phases, we develop a novel triple bargaining game model and provide a new solution concept. In this study, we assume the hierarchical smart-grid system comprised of one SCC, multiple MGCs G = {G 1 , G 2 , . . . ,G n }, various MLCs L = {L 1 , L 2 , . . . ,L m } and numerous micro-grid devices
This model is flexible to be applied expansively into a system with multiple SCCs. Each device D is associated with a specific MLC L 1≤j≤m , which is also associated with a specific MGC. Finally, each MGC is connected to the SCC; expressively At the primary level, the SCC is a game planner and associated G 1≤i≤n ∈ G are bargaining game players. In this game, the total energy resource (E) in the smart-grid system is allocated to each MGC in a fair-efficient manner. At the secondary level, each individual MGC G is a game planner and corresponding L G 1≤j≤m ∈ L are bargaining game players. In a parallel manner, the second-tier games are operated independently by multiple MGCs. At the tertiary level, each individual MLC is a game planner and associated D L 1≤l≤k ∈ D are bargaining game players. In the same manner as the second-tier games, third-tier games are operated independently and dispersively by various MLCs. Table 1 lists the notations used in this paper.
B. THE MAIN CONCEPTS OF VARIOUS COOPERATIVE BARGAINING SOLUTIONS
Bargaining is ubiquitous in real-life. It refers to coalitions of two or more players acting together with a specific common purpose in mind, and a bargaining problem is how to divide the total profit among game players. To characterize the basic concepts of bargaining solutions, we preliminarily define some mathematical expressions. R (R + , R ++ ) denote the set of all (non-negative, positive) real numbers and R n R n + , R n ++ be the n-fold Cartesian product of R (R + , R ++ ). Vector inequalities in R n are denoted by ≥, >, . For x, y ∈ R n , we write x ≥ y if x i ≥y i for all i, x > y if x ≥ y and x = y, and x y if x i > y i for all i. The set N = {1, . . . , n} will denote the game player set, and the notation S designates the feasible set. Each point x of S is a feasible alternative. The point d is the disagreement point and c is the claims point. The d is the outcome of the game if the players do not agree on a utility allocation in the feasible set where d ∈ S ⊂ R n , and the c is the players' demand vector; the point c is an unfeasible point which has to be taken into account when proposing a solution to the conflict [12] - [15] .
Let n be the class of all n-person problems, and a n-person bargaining problem with claims is a triple (S, d, c) where S is a subset of R n and d, c are points in R n . There exists x ∈ S with x > d, c / ∈ S and c ≥ d where the coordinates of x are the utility levels, attained by the n players through the choice of some joint action. A solution is a function, F : n → R n that associates with each (S, d, c) ∈ n a unique point of S, F (S, d, c) , called the solution outcome of (S, d, c) . Consider a reference function given by a mapping g: c →R n . The g (S, d, c) function will serve as an origin from which relative utility gains or losses are measured; it is not necessarily to be a feasible utility allocation [12] - [15] .
The best that player i ∈ N can hope for in (S, d, c), i.e., her ideal payoff in (S, d, c) , is a i (S, d, c) = max {s i |s ∈ S and s ≥ d}. The point a(S, d, c) = (a 1 (S, d, c) , . . . , a n (S, d, c) ) is called the ideal point of (S, d, c) ; it is typically not feasible solution. The midpoint of (S, d, c) is m (S, d, c) = 1 n · a(S, d, c) and always lies in S. LetB be the collections of pairs (S, d, c) , and the set of all bargaining problems is denoted by B ⊆B. A bargaining solution with domain B ⊆B is a map F that assigns to each pair (S, d, c) ∈ B a point F(S, d, c) ∈ S. Normally, a bargaining solution is defined on a subset of B rather thanB. In this study, we assume that bargaining solutions are translation invariant, that is for any t ∈ R n it holds that F (S + t, d + t, c + t) = F (S, d, c)+t. A point s ∈ S is weakly Pareto optimal if there is no t ∈ S with t s, and strongly Pareto optimal if there is no t ∈ S with t > s [13] .
Let D H denote the Hausdorff distance. The Hausdorff distance between two subsets X , Y of a metric space with metric D is defined as
For any two accumulation points S, S one has S =S , that is S and S have identical closures. HenceS is the unique accumulation point of (S p ) p∈N in B. In particular, (B, D H ) is a complete metric space andB is the closure of B. Let e = (1, . . . , 1) ∈ R n and define the diagonal in R n by = {x|x = λ · e forsome λ ∈ R}. A mapping L:R n → R n is called a positive affine transformation if there exist a ∈ R n ++ and ∈ R n such that for all x ∈ R n and all i, (L (x)) i = a i x i + b i . Let L be the class of all positive affine transformations on R n . For a set A ⊂ R n and L ∈ L, let L (A) = {y|∃x ∈ A with y = L (x)}. Note that if (S, d, c) ∈ n , then (L (S) , L (d) , L (c)) ∈ n as well [12] - [15] . VOLUME 7, 2019 The proportional solution, P: for all (S, d, c) ∈ n , P (S, d, c) is the maximal point of S on the segment connecting the point d and the point c [14] , [15] . It can be easily calculated by using the bisection or iterative waterfilling algorithms. The Nash bargaining solution with respect to g, N g : for all (S, d, c) ∈ c g → R n , N g (S, d, c) is defined based on the reference function g : c → R n [12] ; (S, d, c) )
The egalitarian solution E (S, d, c) of a bargaining problem may select a payoff configuration which is not midpoint dominant. The E (S, d, c) is the most prominent monotonic solution that maps each problem S to the weakly Pareto optimal point E (S, d, c) ∈ S with E i (S, d, c) = E j (S, d, c) for all i, j ∈ N . Hence, the arbitrator assigns the same and the highest possible payoff to all players. Based on the idea of E (S, d, c) , the midpoint-constrained egalitarian bargaining solution ME (S, d, c) is formally defined as follows [13] ;
where · denotes the Euclidean norm. If s = t are such that s − E(S, d, c) = t − E (S, d, c) , then E(S, d, c) for all α ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, the solution of (2) is unique, which means that ME (S, d, c) is well-defined [13] . All bargaining solutions are characterized by a collection of desirable axioms -Weak Pareto efficiency, Symmetry, Symmetry with respect tog, Continuity, Midpoint Domination, Midpoint Monotonicity, Scale Invariance, Independence of alternatives other thang (S, d, c) , and Strong Monotonicity [12] - [15] .
• Weak Pareto efficiency (WPE): A bargaining solution
. . = F n (S) for all symmetric bargaining problems S ∈ B .
• Symmetry with respect to g(S g ): If (S, d, c) ∈ n is such that S is symmetric and g (S, d, c) ∈ , then F (S, d, c) ∈ . (F (S, d, c) ) .
• Independence of alternatives other thang (S, d, c) (IA g ): If (S, d, c) , S , d , c ∈ n with S ⊂S , g (S, d, c) = g(S , d , c ) and F S , d , c ∈ S, then  F (S, d, c 
• Strong Monotonicity (ST.MON): For all (S, d, c) , S , d , c with (d, c) = d , c and S ⊆ S ,  F S , d , c ≥ F (S, d, c) .
WPE axiom requires that there be no feasible alternative that all players strictly prefer to the solution outcome. S axiom requires that if the problem is invariant under all exchanges of players, then all players should be treated identically. C axiom requires that a small change in the problem never cause a large change in the solution outcome. Combining MD and MM intuitively translates to finding a solution that satisfies midpoint domination and is, in some sense, as 'close as possible' to a monotonic solution. Taking this aim literally, the midpoint-constrained egalitarian bargaining solution is defined. There are also well known bargaining solutions that satisfy MD axiom, for instance those of Nash and 
C. THE PROPOSED TRIPLE BARGAINING GAME BASED ENERGY MANAGEMENT
To implement the smart-grid management paradigm, the time axis is partitioned into equal intervals of length unit_time ( t ). At each t , energy requirements are received in phases, and each level controllers distribute their energy resources. In our triple game model, SCC, MGCs, MLCs and micro-devices are assumed as game players and they have their own utility functions. Usually, utility functions are functions describing the level of satisfaction or happiness of game players while consuming resources; they can take one or more arguments that affect the overall satisfaction of players. Simply, the utility function of SCC is defined as the total sum of MGCs' utilities. Therefore, the SCC utility function (U SCC (·)) is defined based on the allocated energy resources of associated MGCs, and it maps service quality of the target to a benefit value.
where E t SCC is the total available energy amount of SCC at t . α, β and γ are control parameters to calculate the U SCC (·) function. A t G i and C t G i are the allocated and idealistic energy amounts for the G i at time t , respectively. L G i is the set of MLCs covered by the G i . From the viewpoint of SCC, MD and MM are desirable features for the MGC management. Therefore, we adopt the midpoint-constrained egalitarian bargaining solution to distribute the E t SCC at the primary level. Based on the allocated resources of MLCs, the MGC G i 's utility function U G i (·) is defined in the same manner as the U SCC (·).
where E t G i is the assigned energy amount for the G i at t . A t L k and C t L k are the allocated and idealistic energy amounts of L k at time t , respectively. δ, ζ and µ are control parameters to calculate the U G (·) function. D L l is the set of micro-devices connected to the L l . From the viewpoint of MGC, the assigned energy resource E G should be distributed by considering the RES of associated MLCs. Therefore, the IA g axiom is important for the MGC where g (S, d, c) is defined based on the corresponding RES information. Therefore, we adopt the Nash bargaining solution with claim to assign the E G to corresponding MLCs. In the proposed scheme, the g (S, d, c) for the G i G G i (S, d, c) is defined as follows;
where , σ , θ and η are control parameters to adjust the function G G i (S, d, c) . Based on the allocated resources of associated micro-grid devices, the MLC L k 's utility function U L k (·) is defined in the same manner as the functions (3) and (4).
where E t L k is the assigned energy amount for the MLC L k at t . ω, ψ and χ are control parameters to calculate the U L (·) function. A t D c and C t D c are the allocated and idealistic energy amounts of D c at time t , respectively. From the viewpoint of MLC, the major concern for the energy allocation is to ensure the proportionality of idealistic allocations. Therefore, the ST.MON axiom is necessary for the energy distribution process, and we use the proportional bargaining solution to distribute the E L to corresponding micro-devices. Finally, the micro-grid device D c 's utility function U D c (·) is defined in the same manner as the functions (3),(4) and (6) .
where ξ , ϕ and τ are control parameters to calculate the U D c (·) function.
D. MAIN STEPS OF PROPOSED ENERGY MANAGEMENT SCHEME
Due to the exponential growth in energy demands and increasing requirements on flexibility and interoperability, the hierarchical smart-grid system has been introduced for increasing energy efficiency. This hierarchical control architecture includes three levels, and each level controllers may perform several tasks independently and coordinate with other controllers. For each controller, the most important challenge is how to efficiently distribute the energy resource to improve the system efficiency. In this study, we focus on the main ideas of Nash with claim, midpoint-constrained egalitarian and proportional bargaining solutions to solve the energy distribution problem for the hierarchical smart-grid system. Under different and diversified smart-grid system situations, the proposed triple bargaining game approach is effectively advantageous while ensuring power grid-stability. The principle novelties of our approach are a judicious mixture of different bargaining solutions, and its feasible self-adaptability for the hierarchical smart-grid system infrastructure. The main steps and flowchart of the proposed scheme are described as follows.
Step 1: System factors and control parameters for the hierarchical smart-grid system are determined by a simulation scenario (refer to simulation assumptions and Table 2 in Section IV).
Step 2: As game players, the SCC, multiple MGCs G = {G 1 , G 2 , . . . ,G n }, various MLCs = {L 1 , L 2 , . . . ,L m }, and numerous micro-grid devices D = {D 1 , D 2 , . . . ,D k } have their utility functions according to (3)- (7) . Each payoff is adjusted by the energy allocation amounts (A).
Step 3: At each t , energy requests are received in phases, and the triple bargaining game process is executed sequentially by the level-order.
Step 4: At the primary level, the SCC and G 1≤i≤n ∈ G are bargaining game players, and the energy resource (E t SCC ) of the SCC is allocated based on the midpoint-constrained egalitarian bargaining solution. According to (2) , the SCC distributes its energy amount E t G i to each G i at t .
Step 5: At the secondary level, G 1≤i≤n and corresponding L G 1≤j≤m ∈ L are bargaining game players. In a parallel manner, individual second-tier games are operated independently by multiple G 1≤i≤n .
Step 6: In each second-tier game, the energy resource (E t G ) is allocated based on the Nash with claim bargaining solution. According to (1) , each G distributes its E t G to the corresponding MLCs at t . Step 7: At the tertiary level, L G 1≤j≤m ∈ L and micro devices are bargaining game players. In the same manner as the second-tier games, individual thirdtier games are also operated independently and dispersively.
Step 8: In each individual third-tier game, the energy resource (E t L ) is distributed to the associated micro-devices. According to the proportional bargaining solution, each L distributes its E t L to associated micro-devices at t .
Step 9: For each time period t , game players are hierarchically interconnected and can cause cascade interactions to reach an efficient solution for the smart-grid energy management problem.
Step 10: Constantly, game players are self-monitoring the current smart-grid system situation. For the next time period t+1 , the proposed triple bargaining game is re-triggered; proceeds to Step 2.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we set the simulation model and conduct a numerical analysis in order to validate the performance superiority of our approach by comparing with the existing CAHB, GDET and LFEM schemes [8]- [10] . First of all, we introduce the scenario setup of the simulation, and control parameters are listed in Table 2 .
• Simulated hierarchical smart-grid system consists of one SCC, five MGCs G = {G 1 , G 2 , . . . ,G 5 }, twenty five MLCs L = {L 1 , L 2 , . . . ,L 25 } and five hundred microgrid devices D = {D 1 , D 2 , . . . ,D 500 }.
• MGCs and MLCs are regularly positioned as a grid in the area. Micro-grid devices are randomly distributed in the area and connected to the nearest MLC.
• In order to represent energy request services, eight different types are assumed, and energy service request rate per micro-device D is Poisson process (ρ). The offered rate range is varied from 0 to 3.
• The disagreement point d is set to zero, and the claims point c is set to the idealistic energy amount (C) of services.
• For each t , the total smart-grid energy capacity (E) in the SCC is 100 Terawatt (TW), and the RES of each MLC is randomly decided value from a uniform distribution in the open interval {50MW.. 500MW}. • Network performance measures obtained on the basis of 100 simulation runs are plotted as functions of the offered energy service request rate (ρ).
• For calculation simplicity, the energy resource is specified in terms of basic power units (BPUs), where one BPU is the minimum amount of energy allocation process. In our system, The BPU of SCC, SMC and MLC are 1 TW, 0.1 TW and 10 GW, respectively.
• Performance criteria obtained through simulation are energy utilization, normalized micro-device payoff, and the fairness of controllers.
• We assume the absence of physical obstacles in the experiments. Based on the simulation criteria -energy utilization, normalized micro-device payoff, and the fairness of controllers, the performance is evaluated mainly to demonstrate the validity of the proposed scheme. The simulation parameters are presented in Table 2 . Each parameter has its own characteristics.
The energy utilization of smart-grid system is shown in Figure 2 . In this study, energy utilization is the ratio of currently using energy to the total energy amount that the system can handle. This performance criterion is strongly related to the system throughput. Typically, a higher energy utilization can increase the system capacity; it is more profitable for the system operator. Therefore, from the viewpoint of system operator, it is a main criterion on the performance evaluation. As can be seen in this figure, the energy utilization monotonically increases while increasing the number of energy requirements. However, our proposed scheme is designed based on the triple bargaining game model and effectively handle the limited energy resource at each level. Therefore, our approach is well suited for the hierarchical smart-grid infrastructure, and we can maintain the stable performance superiority under different energy requirement rates compared to the existing CAHB, GDET and LFEM schemes. Figure 3 demonstrates the normalized micro-device payoff with different energy requirement rates. Evidently, the payoffs are increasing with the provided energy. We can notice that performance trend is very similar to the energy utilization. As the energy requirements increase, micro-device payoffs also increase. It is intuitively correct. Nash with claim, midpoint-constrained egalitarian and proportional bargaining solutions are commonly designed based on the WPE axiom. Therefore, our proposed scheme mainly focuses on the feature of Pareto efficiency in the energy distribution problem in the smart-grid system. The simulation result in Figure 3 confirms that our bargaining based approach strategically share the energy resource while provisioning higher payoffs for micro-devices. From the viewpoint of end-users, it is a key factor to evaluate their satisfactions. Figure 4 depicts the distribution fairness among system controllers. Fairness is a prominent control issue to the limited resource allocation problem, and it should be considered explicitly at the design stage of resource control algorithms. In this study, we follow the Jain's fairness index to characterize the fairness notion [16] ; it has been widely used to measure the fairness for the network resource allocation problem. In our proposed triple game model, adopted bargaining solutions include fairness-oriented axiomatic properties, and play a crucial role in the fair-efficient operation of the smart-grid system. Therefore, our proposed scheme can share the energy resource fairly compared to the existing schemes. The simulation results displayed in Figure 4 demonstrate that the proposed scheme can attain a stable and appropriate fairness under widely different energy requirement intensities.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a new energy management scheme for the hierarchical smart-grid system. Based on the proposed triple game model, each level controllers make control decisions, which can cause cascade interactions to reach a fair-efficient solution. With the Nash, extended-egalitarian and proportional bargaining solutions in three control levels, the total energy of smart-grid system is hierarchically controlled, and the smart-grid utility is maximized adaptively to increase the system reliability. Therefore, our approach effectively handles the limited energy resource at each level while ensuring the hierarchical smart-grid infrastructure. Finally, simulation results are presented to illustrate the effectiveness of our proposed approach compared with the existing smartgrid energy management protocols. Specifically, the proposed scheme increases the energy utilization, micro-device payoff and fairness among system controllers by 5%, 10% and 30%, respectively than the existing schemes.
For the hierarchical smart-grid infrastructure, there will be different open issues and practical challenges for the future study. First, we will incorporate the machine learning issues while taking into account clustering behaviors of each level controllers. Second, by using a mathematical analysis, we can carefully investigate the required information exchange and communication overhead in smart-grid systems. Third, we intend to provide an incentive for energy trading among micro-grids while examining the impact of reward rules. Last but not least, we are keen to implement our protocol to real test-bed and analyze the system performance, which is hopeful to achieve valuable experience for practitioners.
